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The organization of neocortex into layers is one of its most salient anatomical features. These 
layers include circuits that form functional columns in cortical maps. A major unsolved problem 
concerns how bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal interactions are organized within cortical 
layers to generate adaptive behaviors. This article models how these interactions help visual 
cortex to realize: (1) the binding process whereby cortex groups distributed data into coherent 
object representations; (2) the attentional process whereby cortex selectively processes important 
events; and (3) the developmental and learning processes whereby cortex shapes its circuits to 
match environmental constraints. New computational ideas about feedback systems suggest how 
neocortex develops and learns in a stable way, and why top-down attention requires converging 
bottom-up inputs to fully activate cortical cells, whereas perceptual groupings do not. 
Introduction.  The cerebral cortex is the seat of our highest forms of intelligence, and its 
understanding is thus a goal for all students of mind and brain. Neocortex has an intricate design 
which exhibits a characteristic organization into six distinct cortical layers (Brodmann, 1909;  
Martin, 1989). Differences in the thickness of these layers and the sizes and shapes of neurons 
led the German anatomist Korbinian Brodmann to identify more than fifty divisions, or areas, of 
neocortex. This classification has been invaluable to later scientists as a basis for discerning 
different functional roles for different parts of the brain. On the other hand, why the neocortex 
has six layers, or indeed a laminar design, has remained a mystery from a functional point of 
view. The present article proposes a model that provides clear functional roles for these layers 
for purposes of visual perception, and suggests that similar functional roles may be at work in all 
sensory and cognitive processing. 
Linking cortical anatomy to behavior cannot be done without a sufficiently powerful method. 
This is true because cortical organization exhibits multiple scales of processing, including 
individual neurons within the various layers, neural circuits that link these neurons within and 
between these layers, functional columns that are defined through these interlaminar interactions, 
cortical maps that are defined by the global organization of these columns within a cortical area, 
and thalamocortical and corticocortical interactions that occur between different thalamic and 
cortical areas. These cortical interactions, moreover, occur both bottom-up, from more peripheral 
to more central areas, and top-down, from more central to more peripheral areas, and have a 
characteristic laminar organization of their own. 
In order to make functional sense of such complex interactions, one needs to be able to link 
cortical organization to the behaviors that it controls; one needs to show how these designs lead 
to useful behavioral properties that have been selected and maintained through evolution. The 
present article describes such a linkage. It shows that perceptual, attentional, developmental, and 
learning properties that are known to be carried out by visual cortex place severe, and seemingly 
contradictory, demands on cortical organization. When one tries to realize all of these constraints 
within a single, unified cortical architecture, a model of how this is accomplished can be 
identified, whose every component is supported by neurobiological data. In addition to providing 
a unified explanation of many behavioral and neurobiological data for which no alternative 
explanation has yet arisen, this cortical model also makes a number of testable predictions. The 
constraints that will be described herein are all well-known. They have not been simultaneously 
applied before in part because they are usually studied experimentally by different groups of 
scientists, and also because their remarkably constraining nature does not become apparent until 
one attempts to model all of them at once. S.  Grossberg            
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Perceptual Grouping and Attention: A Paradox. Some of the main constraints can be stated in 
terms of perceptual processes that are familiar to us all. During visual perception, the visual 
cortex can generate perceptual groupings and can focus attention upon objects of interest. 
Perceptual grouping  is the process whereby the brain organizes image contrasts into emergent 
boundary structures that segregate objects and their backgrounds in response to texture, shading 
and depth cues in scenes and images (Julesz, 1971; Ramachandran and Nelson, 1976; Beck, 
Prazdny, and Rosenfeld, 1983; Polat and Sagi, 1994). Perceptual grouping is a basic step in 
solving the “binding problem”, whereby spatially distributed features are bound into 
representations of objects and events in the world. Illusory contours are a particularly vivid form 
of perceptual grouping. Figure 1 shows how an illusory contour can form over image positions 
that do not receive contrastive bottom-up inputs from an image or scene. Perceptual groupings 
can form preattentively and automatically, without requiring the conscious attention of a viewing 
subject. 
Attention  enables humans and other animals to selectively process information that is of interest 
to them. In contrast to perceptual grouping, top-down attention does not form visible percepts 
over positions that receive no bottom-up inputs. Attention can sensitize, or prime, an observer to 
expect an object to occur at a given location, or with particular stimulus properties (Posner, 
1980; Duncan, 1984). But attention, by itself, is no substitute for the object’s actual appearance. 
Were attention able to routinely generate fully formed perceptual representations, we could not 
tell  the difference between external reality and internal fantasy.  
                A                                             B                                    C 
       
Figure 1. An illusory Kaniza square can be perceived (A) colinear to edge inducers and (B) 
perpendicular to line-end inducers. (C) Model simulation of the latter type of boundary grouping 
(reprinted with permission from Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997). 
Given that perceptual grouping and attention make opposite requirements on bottom-up inputs, 
the question of how they are simultaneously realized within the same circuits of the visual cortex 
is a difficult one to answer. One possible answer to this question is that these circuits are not  
simultaneously realized within the same cortical areas. This answer is not, however, supported 
by recent cortical data. For example, it has been shown that short-range perceptual groupings can 
occur within cortical area V1 (Redies, Crook, and Creutzfeldt, 1986; Grosof, Shapley, and 
Hawken, 1993) and that longer-range perceptual groupings can occur within cortical area V2 S.  Grossberg            
4 
(Von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and von der Heydt, 1989). In 
addition, attentional focussing occurs from the earliest visual cortical area V1 top-down to the 
Lateral Geniculate Nucleus, or LGN (Sillito, Jones, Herstein, and West, 1994). Attention also 
operates in visual cortical areas V1, V2, and V4 (Motter, 1994a, 1994b; Reynolds, Nicholas, 
Chelazzi, and Desimone, 1995; Beauchamp, Cox, and DeYoe, 1997; Hupé et al., 1997; Ito, 
Westheimer, and Gilbert, 1997; Johnson and Burkhalter, 1997; Lamme, Zipser, and Spekreijse, 
1997; McAdams and Maunsell, 1997; Press and van Essen, 1997) and areas MT and MST 
(O’Craven  et al., 1997; Treue and Maunsell, 1997). Many recent neurophysiological 
experiments show that attentional processing operates throughout the visual cortex. 
Both perceptual grouping and attentional modulation are thus integrated within the visual 
cortical areas V1 and V2. How does this circuitry form perceptual groupings that can  complete 
a boundary grouping over locations which receive no bottom-up visual inputs, whereas top-down 
attention  cannot  do so? Why should  attention be deployed throughout the visual cortex, 
including cortical areas which previously were thought to accomplish purely preattentive 
processing? An answer can be found by exploring the link between attention and learning, and 
using this link to further constrain the model. 
The Link Between Attention and Learning. Earlier modeling work has suggested that top-
down attention is a key mechanism whereby the brain solves the stability-plasticity  dilemma 
(Grossberg, 1980, 1982; Grossberg and Stone, 1986; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991, 1993; 
Grossberg, 1995; Grossberg and Merrill, 1996). The stability-plasticity dilemma concerns that 
fact that our brains can rapidly learn enormous amounts of information throughout life, without 
just as rapidly forgetting what they already know. Brains are plastic  and can rapidly learn new 
experiences, without losing the stability  that prevents catastrophic forgetting.  
The fact that multiple thalamic and cortical levels develop through experience-dependent 
learning (Hubel, Wiesel, and LeVay, 1977; Stryker and Harris, 1986; Calloway and Katz, 1990; 
Antonini and Stryker, 1993a, 1993b; DeAngelis, Ohzawa, and Freeman, 1993; Ghose, Freeman, 
and Ohzawa, 1994; Galuske and Singer, 1996) raises the question of how such attentive 
processes may be realized within neocortex in order to stabilize this learning through time. This 
question, in turn, leads to further constraints on cortical design, because at least some perceptual 
groupings can form preattentively, and provide the substrate upon which higher-level attentional 
processes can act. How can the preattentive grouping mechanisms develop in a stable way, 
before any higher-order attentional processes can develop with which to stabilize them? Why 
does not this problem lead to an infinite regress; namely, why is it not the case that attentional 
mechanisms cannot develop until preattentive mechanisms do, but preattentive mechanisms 
cannot develop stably in the absence of attention? I call this the attention-preattention interface 
problem.  It is an interface  problem because it is shown below how laminar cortical circuits 
enable preattentive grouping processes to use some of the same circuitry that attentive 
mechanisms use, even before attentive mechanisms may come into play, in order to stabilize 
their own cortical development and learning. 
The solution proposed herein to the attention-preattention interface problem builds upon earlier 
efforts to solve the stability-plasticity dilemma. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, proposes a 
solution of how attention solves the stability-plasticity dilemma by modeling how bottom-up 
signals activate top-down expectations whose signals are matched against bottom-up data 
(Figure 2A). Both the bottom-up and top-down pathways contain adaptive weights, or long-term S.  Grossberg            
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memory traces, that may be modified by experience. The learned top-down expectations “focus 
attention” upon information that matches them (Figure 2B). They select, synchronize, and 
amplify the activities of cells within the attentional focus, while suppressing the activities of 
irrelevant cells, which could otherwise be incorporated into previously learned memories and 
thereby destabilize them. 
The cell activities which survive such top-down attentional focusing rapidly reactivate bottom-
up pathways, thereby generating a type of feedback resonance between bottom-up and top-down 
signal exchanges (Figure 2A). Such resonances rapidly bind distributed information at multiple 
levels of brain processing into context-sensitive representations of objects and events. These 
resonances are proposed to support slower processes of learning; hence the name adaptive  
resonance. 
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Figure 2. (A) Patterns of activation, or short-term memory (STM), on a lower processing level 
send bottom-up signals to a higher processing level. These signals are multiplied by adaptive 
weights, or learned long-term memory (LTM) traces, which influence the activation of the cells 
at the higher processing level. These latter cells, in turn, activate top-town expectation signals 
that are also multiplied by learned LTM traces. These top-down expectations are matched 
against the STM pattern that is active at the lower level. (B) This matching processes confirms 
and amplifies STM activations that are supported by large LTM traces in an active top-down 
expectation, and suppresses STM activations that do not get top-down support. The size of the 
hemidisks at the end of the top-down pathways represents the strength of the learned LTM trace 
that is stored in that pathway. (C) The ART Matching Rule may be realized by a top-down on-
center off-surround network, as discussed in the text. 
ART has shown, using mathematical proofs and data explanations, how the learning of receptive 
field properties during early development, and the learning of perceptual and cognitive 
representations during adulthood, could easily suffer catastrophic forgetting in response to a 
changing world (Grossberg, 1976a, 1976b; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987), and how top-down 
attention can stabilize learning if it satisfies four properties (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987, 
1991), which together are called the ART Matching Rule: 
  Bottom-Up Automatic Activation: A cell, or cell population, can become active enough 
to generate output signals if it receives a large enough bottom-up input, other things being equal. 
Such an input can drive the cell to supraliminal levels of activation.  
 Top-Down  Priming: A cell becomes subliminally active if it receives only a large top-
down expectation input. Such a top-down priming signal can sensitize, or modulate, the cell, and 
thereby prepare it to react more quickly and vigorously to subsequent bottom-up inputs that 
match the top-down prime. The top-down prime by itself cannot, however, generate supraliminal 
output signals from the cell. 
 Match:  A cell becomes active if it receives large convergent bottom-up and top-down 
inputs. Such a matching process can generate enhanced activation as resonance takes hold.  
 Mismatch:  A cell’s activity is suppressed, even if it receives a large bottom-up input, if 
it also receives only a small, or zero, top-down expectation input.  
ART originally proposed four related circuits that could all realize these properties (Carpenter 
and Grossberg, 1987) and thereby stabilize the learning process. More recent data analyses have 
suggested that variants of the simplest circuit, a top-down on-center off-surround network 
(Figure 2C), is used by the brain (Grossberg, 1995). Figure 2C clarifies how such a circuit can 
achieve all four properties. In particular, when only bottom-up signals are active, all cells can 
fire that receive large enough inputs. When only top-down attention is active, cells that receive 
inhibition but no excitation get inhibited, while cells that receive a combination of excitation and 
inhibition can get at most subliminally activated due to the balance between excitation and 
inhibition. When bottom-up and top-down inputs match, as in pathway 2 of Figure 2C, the two 
excitatory sources of excitation that converge at  the cell can overwhelm the one inhibitory 
source; it is a case of “two-against-one.” When bottom-up and top-down inputs mismatch, as in 
pathway 1 of Figure 2C, the top-down inhibition can neutralize the bottom-up excitation; it is a 
case of “one-against-one.”  S.  Grossberg            
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Is Attention Too Slow and Weak to Matter? Many scientists have resisted the concept that 
top-down attention plays an important role, despite the fact that there are massive top-down 
pathways throughout the cortex (Macchi and Rinvik, 1976; Tsumoto, Creutzfeldt, and Legendy, 
1978; van Essen and Maunsell, 1983; Felleman and van Essen, 1991), due to the belief that 
feedback cannot operate quickly enough to influence cortical information processing. Two 
mathematical properties of ART systems show such concerns to be groundless: First, cortical 
interactions that obey ART properties can choose the correct cells on the first pass of bottom-up 
signalling, if the input pattern is familiar to the system; second, resonance can stabilize within 
even a single processing cycle of attentional feedback (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987, 1991; 
Grossberg and Somers, 1991).  
Another roadblock to understanding derives from the properties, explained by ART, that top-
down attention  accomplishes subliminal, or subthreshold, priming  and matching.  By itself, it 
cannot supraliminally activate cells, thereby enabling them to generate output signals, and thus 
seems to be too “weak” to significantly affect cortical processing.  For example, Zeki and Shipp 
(Zeki and Shipp, 1988, p. 316) wrote that “backward connections seem not to excite cells in 
lower areas, but instead influence the way they respond to stimuli”. Likewise, the data of Sillito 
et al. (1994, pp. 479-482) on attentional feedback from V1 to LGN led them to conclude that 
“the cortico-thalamic input is only strong enough to exert an effect on those dLGN cells that are 
additionally polarized by their retinal input...the feedback circuit searches for correlations that 
support the ‘hypothesis’ represented by a particular pattern of cortical activity”. Their 
experiments demonstrated all of the properties of the ART Matching Rule, since they found in 
addition that “cortically induced correlation of relay cell activity produces coherent firing in 
those groups of relay cells with receptive-field alignments appropriate to signal the particular 
orientation of the moving contour to the cortex...this increases the gain of the input for feature-
linked events detected by the cortex”. In other words, top-down priming, by itself, cannot fully 
activate LGN cells; it needs matched bottom-up retinal inputs to do so; and those LGN cells 
whose bottom-up signals support cortical activity get synchronized and amplified by this 
feedback. In addition, anatomical studies have shown that the top-down V1 to LGN pathway 
realizes a top-down on-center off-surround network (Dubin and Cleland, 1977; Weber, Kalil, and 
Behan, 1989), as in Figure 2.  
What Stabilizes Perceptual Development and Learning? The above discussion suggests that 
top-down attentional mechanisms should be present in every  cortical area wherein learning can 
occur, since without top-down learned expectations that focus attention via the ART Matching 
Rule, any such learned memories could easily be degraded due to catastrophic forgetting.  
These analyses should, in particular, apply to the perceptual grouping process, because the 
cortical horizontal connections that support perceptual grouping in areas like V1 develop 
through a learning process that is influenced by visual experience (Luhmann, Martinez Millan, 
and Singer, 1986; Calloway and Katz, 1990; Gilbert and Wiesel, 1992; Lowel and Singer, 1992; 
Antonini and Stryker, 1993a; Galuske and Singer, 1996). It is also known that many 
developmental and learning processes, including those that control horizontal connections, are 
stabilized dynamically, and can be reactivated by lesions and other sources of cortical imbalance 
(Das and Gilbert, 1995; Gilbert and Wiesel, 1992), and that adult learning uses the same types of 
mechanisms as the infant developmental processes upon which it builds (Bailey et al., 1992; 
Kandel and O’Dell, 1992; Mayford et al., 1992). What cortical mechanisms ensure this type of 
dynamical stability?  S.  Grossberg            
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This is a particularly challenging problem for the case of perceptual groupings for two reasons 
which, on the surface, seem to be unrelated, but which will turn out to be intimately related on a 
mechanistic level. The first reason is that perceptual groupings can form preattentively. How, 
then, can attention control their stability during infant development and adult learning? This is 
the attention-preattention interface problem  that was mentioned above. The second reason, also 
noted above,  is that perceptual groupings can form over positions that do not receive bottom-up 
inputs, as in the case of illusory contours. They therefore seem to violate the ART Matching 
Rule. How, then, can the horizontal connections that generate perceptual groupings maintain 
themselves in a stable way? Why are they not washed away whenever a grouping forms over 
positions that do not receive a bottom-up input? 
My proposed answer to this question unifies two types of neural models which have been 
developed along separate paths for two decades: the attentive ART model, and the preattentive 
perceptual grouping model that is called the Boundary Contour System, or BCS (Grossberg and 
Mingolla, 1985; Grossberg, 1994; Gove, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1995). Until the present, it 
has not been possible to understand how ART circuits are embodied within the laminar 
architecture of visual cortex. Recent work on the BCS has suggested how preattentive grouping 
may be carried out by laminar visual cortex. My proposed synthesis of how attention, perceptual 
grouping, development, and perceptual learning are realized by the laminar circuits of visual 
cortex builds upon this new foundation. The present article focuses on one combination of 
intracortical and intercortical pathways. It does not attempt to model all cortical connections, or 
the variations that exist across species. Preliminary studies indicate, however, that the principles 
modeled herein can be elaborated and adapted to handle these cases. S.  Grossberg            
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Analog Coherence of Perceptual Groupings. This BCS model proposes how the laminar 
circuitry of visual cortex enables perceptual groupings to maintain their analog and spatial 
context-sensitivity in response to changes in stimulus properties (Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 
1997). Analog sensitivity means that perceptual groupings can alter their form in response to 
graded changes in stimulus properties. For example, one boundary grouping, such as an illusory 
contour, may form if some signals are weak and others strong, whereas a different grouping may 
form if the reverse relative signals strengths occur. Spatial context-sensitivity means that the 
cortex can respond flexibly to spatial rearrangements of the stimuli that are to be grouped.  
The grouping process actively selects and binds together the most salient groupings for 
conscious perception, while suppressing less salient groupings. This selection, or binding, 
process endows each grouping with an inner coherence, so that object representations are not 
merely the sum of their features. Unfortunately, processes that select winning groupings while 
inhibiting losing groupings tend to wipe out analog sensitivity; they tend to generate binary 
outcomes. Because analog values carry useful information about objects and events, it is 
important to understand how the cortex can bind distributed information into coherent 
representations without a loss of analog sensitivity. Remarkably, the laminar circuitry of visual 
cortex is capable of robustly realizing the key property of analog coherence  whereby groupings 
form coherently without losing analog or spatial context-sensitivity. 
Four Preattentive Designs of Visual Cortex. Four circuit properties summarize this proposal of 
how the visual cortex, notably areas V1 and V2, uses its laminar design to generate perceptual 
groupings that preserve analog coherence. Each design principle will be described along with 
cortical data that it explains. Then four more circuit properties will be proposed whereby 
attention, development, and learning are integrated into this laminar design. 
  Design 1. Analog Sensitivity to Bottom-Up Sensory Inputs. Bottom-up inputs from the 
retina go through the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) on their way to cortex. LGN outputs 
directly excite layer 4  (Hubel and Wiesel, 1962; Chapman, Zahs, and Stryker, 1991; Reid and 
Alonso, 1995). LGN inputs also excite layer 6, which then indirectly influences layer 4 via an 
on-center off-surround network of cells (Ferster and Lindstrom, 1985; Grieve and Sillito, 1991a, 
1991b, 1995), as in Figure 3A. The net effect of LGN inputs on layer 4 cells is thus via an on-
center off-surround network. Such a feedforward on-center off-surround network of cells can 
preserve the analog sensitivity of, and normalize, the activities of target cells if these cells obey 
the membrane equations of neurophysiology (Grossberg, 1973, 1980; Douglas et al., 1995). In 
the present case, such a network preserves the analog sensitivity of layer 4 cells in response to 
LGN inputs that may vary greatly in intensity. 
  Design 2. Bipole Boundary Grouping. The active layer 4 cells input to pyramidal cells 
in layer 2/3. These cells initiate the formation of perceptual groupings. They generate excitatory 
signals among themselves using monsynaptic long-range horizontal connections, and inhibition 
using short-range disynaptic inhibitory connections (Hirsch and Gilbert, 1991; McGuire et al., 
1991), as in Figure 3B. These interactions support inward perceptual groupings between two or 
more boundary inducers (von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and von 
der Heydt, 1989), but not outward groupings from a single inducer (Hirsch and Gilbert, 1991; 
Cannon and Fullenkamp, 1993; Knierim and van Essen, 1992; Somers, Nelson, and Sur, 1995; 
Stemmler, Usher, and Niebur, 1995), as in the case of illusory contours (Figure 1). If a single S.  Grossberg            
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inducer could generate groupings, our percepts would become crowded with webs of boundaries 
that spread out from every feature in a scene.  S.  Grossberg            
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Figure 3. A model circuit of retinal, lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and cortical V1 
interactions: Open symbols indicate excitatory interactions and closed symbols inhibitory 
interactions. (A) Feedforward circuit from retina to LGN to cortical layers 4 and 6: Retina: 
Retinal ON cells have an on-center off-surround organization. Retinal OFF cells have an off-
center on-surround organization. LGN: The LGN ON and OFF cells receive feedforward ON 
and OFF cell inputs from the retina. Layer 4: Layer 4 cells receive feedforward inputs from LGN 
and layer 6. LGN ON and OFF cell excitatory inputs to layer 4 directly establish oriented simple 
cell receptive fields. Layer 6 cells excite layer 4 cells with a narrow on-center and inhibit them 
using inhibitory interneurons that span a broader off-surround. Like-oriented layer 4 simple cells 
with opposite contrast polarities compete (not shown) before generating half-wave rectified 
outputs that converge on layer 2/3 pyramidal (complex) cells. Layer 2/3: The converging simple S.  Grossberg            
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cell outputs enable complex cells to respond to both polarities. They hereby full-wave rectify the 
image. [Figure caption continued on next page.] 
Figure 3 Continued. (B) Horizontal grouping interactions in layer 2/3: After being activated by 
inputs from layer 4, layer 2/3 pyramidal (complex) cells excite each other monosynaptically via 
horizontal connections, primarily on their apical dendrites. They also inhibit one another via 
disynaptic inhibition that is mediated by model smooth stellate cells. Multiple horizontal 
connections share a common pool of stellate cells near each target pyramidal cell. This ensures 
that boundaries form inwardly between pairs or greater numbers of boundary inducers, but not 
outwardly from a single inducer. (C) Cortical feedback loop from Layer 2/3 to Layer 6: Layer 6 
cells receive excitatory inputs from layer 2/3. The long-range cooperation hereby engages the 
feedforward layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network, which then reactivates layer 2/3 cells. 
This “folded feedback” loop can select winning groupings without a loss of analog coherence. 
(D) Outputs from layer 2/3 to area V2 directly excite layer 4 cells and layer 6 cells, which 
indirectly influence layer 4 cells via an on-center off-surround network, as in area V1. 
These grouping properties are ensured in the following way: When a single active pyramidal cell 
sends horizontal monosynaptic excitation to other pyramidal cells, this excitation is inhibited by 
the disynaptic inhibition that it also generates; this is another case of “one-against-one”. A 
different result obtains when two or more pyramidal cells are activated at positions that are 
located at opposite sides of a target pyramidal cell, and all the cells are approximately colinear 
across space. Then the excitation from the active pyramidal cells summates at the target cell, 
thereby generating a larger total excitatory input than a single pyramidal cell could. In addition, 
the active cells all excite a single population of disynaptic inhibitory interneurons, which 
generates a saturating, or normalized, inhibitory output to the target cell. Thus excitation is 
bigger than inhibition in this case, so that grouping can occur; it is another case of “two-against-
one.” This combination of constraints is called the bipole  property. Layer 2/3 pyramidal cells 
may hereby become active either due to direct inputs from layer 4, or due to bipole boundary 
groupings that form in response to other active layer 2/3 cells. 
  Design 3. Folded Feedback and Analog Coherence. The active cells in layer 2/3 send 
excitatory feedback signals to layer 6 via layer 5 (Gilbert and Wiesel, 1979; Ferster and 
Lindstrom, 1983), as in Figure 3C. Layer 6, in turn, once again activates the on-center off-
surround network from layer 6 to 4. This feedback process is called folded feedback, because 
feedback signals from layer 2/3 to layer 6 get transmitted in a feedforward fashion back to layer 
4. The feedback is hereby “folded” back into the feedforward flow of bottom-up information 
within the laminar cortical circuits.  
Folded feedback turns the cortex into a feedback network that binds the cells throughout layers 
2/3, 4, and 6 into functional columns (Mountcastle, 1957; Hubel and Wiesel, 1962, 1977). The 
on-center off-surround network helps to select the strongest groupings that are formed in layer 
2/3  and to inhibit weaker groupings, while preserving the analog values of the selected 
groupings. In particular, the on-center signals from layer 6-to-4 support the activities of those 
pyramidal cells in layer 2/3 that are part of the strongest horizontal groupings. The off-surround 
signals inhibit inputs to layer 4 that were supporting less active groupings in layer 2/3. In this 
way, signals from layer 4 to the less active groupings in layer 2/3 are removed, and thus these 
groupings collapse.  S.  Grossberg            
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  Design 4. Self-Similar Hierarchical Boundary Processing. Converging evidence 
suggests that area V2 replicates the structure of area V1, but at a larger spatial scale (Kisvarday 
et al., 1995). In particular, layer 2/3 in area V1 sends bottom-up inputs to layers 4 and 6 of area 
V2, much as LGN sends bottom-up inputs to layers 4 and 6 of area V1 (van Essen and Maunsell, 
1983; Felleman and van Essen, 1991); see Figure 3D. This input pattern from V1 to V2 can 
preserve the analog sensitivity of layer 4 cells in V2 for the same reason that the LGN inputs to 
V1 can preserve the analog sensitivity of layer 4 cells in V1. The shorter perceptual groupings in 
layer 2/3 of area V1 (Redies, Crook, and Creutzfeldt, 1986; Grosof, Shapley, and Hawken, 1993) 
are proposed to group together, and thereby enhance the signal-to-noise ratio of, nearby V1 cells 
with similar orientation and disparity selectivity. The longer perceptual groupings in area V2 
(van der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and von der Heydt, 1989) are 
proposed to build long-range boundary segmentations that separate figure-from-background; 
generate 3-D groupings of the edges, textures, shading, and stereo information that go into object 
representations; and complete boundaries across gaps in bottom-up signals due to the retinal 
blind spot and veins (Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1997). Both types of 
groupings achieve analog coherence by using the same type of laminar circuitry. Computer 
simulations of such groupings are reported elsewhere (Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997). 
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Figure 4. (A) Top-down corticogeniculate feedback from Layer 6: LGN ON and OFF cells 
receive topographic excitatory feedback from layer 6 in V1, and more broadly distributed 
inhibitory feedback via LGN inhibitory interneurons that are excited by layer 6 signals. The 
feedback signals pool outputs over all cortical orientations and are delivered equally to ON and 
OFF cells. Cortiogeniculate feedback selects, gain-controls, and synchronizes LGN cells that are 
consistent with the cortical activation that they cause, thereby acting like a type of automatic 
attentional focus. (B) Attentional feedback from V2 to V1: Layer 6 in V2 activates layer 6 in V1, 
which then activates the layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network that attentionally primes 
layer 4 cells. (C) One feedback pathway arises from Layer 6 cells in V2 and activates apical 
dendrites in Layer 1 of V1. Cells in Layer 5 are activated through these apical dendrites and 
thereupon activate Layer 6 cells.  
Four Attentive Designs of Visual Cortex. How does top-down attention fit into these layered 
circuits without disturbing the preattentive grouping process? Four attentive design principles are S.  Grossberg            
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proposed to accomplish this, and to enable cortical development and learning to proceed in a 
stable fashion. 
  Design 5. Top-Down Feedback from V1 to LGN. As noted above, layer 6 of area V1 
sends a top-down on-center off-surround network to the LGN (Murphy and Sillito, 1987; Weber, 
Kalil, and Behan, 1989; Murphy and Sillito, 1996), as in Figure 4A. This top-down pathway 
automatically focuses attention on those LGN cells whose activities succeed in activating V1 
cells. Data of Sillito et al. (1994) show that this feedback obeys the ART Matching Rule, and 
thus can only subliminally activate, or modulate, LGN cells. Matched bottom-up inputs are 
needed to supraliminally activate LGN cells while top-down signals are active. This process is 
predicted to help stabilize the development of disparity-tuned complex cells in V1 during the 
visual critical period. 
  Design 6. Folded Feedback from Layer 6 of V2 to Layer 4 of V1. A variant of this 
top-down process seems to occur at all stages of visual cortex, and probably beyond. Layer 6 in a 
given cortical area, such as V2, generates top-down cortical signals to layer 6 of lower cortical 
areas, such as V1, where they activate the layer 6-to-4 folded feedback network in the lower area 
(Figure 4B). One such known top-down pathway exits layer 6 in V2 and activates V1 via layer 1 
(Pandya and Yeterian, 1985). This pathway activates layer 1 apical dendrites of layer 5 cells, 
which relay them to layer 6 cells in V1 (Cauller and Connors, 1994; Rockland, 1994), as in 
Figure 4C. Top-down feedback hereby activates a top-down on-center off-surround circuit, much 
like the ART circuit in Figure 2. I propose that it is realized in cortex using outputs from layer 6 
of a given cortical area to activate layer 4 of a lower cortical area via layer 6-to-4 folded 
feedback. This proposal is supported by  neurophysiological data showing that top-down signals 
activate the center and inhibit the surround of area V1 cells (Bullier et al., 1996). 
  Design 7. Layer 6-to-4 Signals are Subliminal. The ART Matching Rule predicts that 
this top-down pathway subliminally  activates, or modulates, cells in layer 4. I propose that this 
subliminal property is due to the fact that the on-center off-surround interactions from layer 6-to-
4 are balanced so that at most a weak excitatory effect occurs after activating the circuit via top-
down feedback. This hypothesis is consistent with neurophysiological data from ferret visual 
cortex showing that the layer 6-to-4 circuit is functionally weak (Wittmer, Dalva, and Katz, 
1997). In addition, Hupé et al.  (1997, p. 1031) note: “feedback connections from area V2 
modulate but do not create center-surround interactions in V1 neurons.”  Thus top-down 
feedback from layer 6 of V2 is predicted to be able to supraliminally activate layer 6 of V1 but 
not layer 4 of V1. 
This functional “weakness” does not prevent the top-down circuit from having a major effect on 
cortical cell activations when the cortex is activated bottom-up by visual inputs. In particular, by 
inhibiting activities of layer 4 cells whose layer 2/3 cell projections are not bound into strong 
groupings, the layer 6-to-4 circuit can dramatically change the balance  of activation across the 
cortex, thereby enabling the strongest groupings to become amplified and resonant. This analysis 
predicts that attentional and grouping constraints from higher levels of cortex can feed back to 
selectively bias the groupings that arise at lower cortical levels. In particular, the “higher-order” 
boundary completion and figure-ground perception grouping properties of V2 can select cells in 
V1 which are consistent with them.  S.  Grossberg            
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  Design 8. Two Bottom-Up Input Sources to Layer 4. A simple functional explanation 
can now be provided of why there are direct bottom-up inputs to layer 4, as well as indirect 
bottom-up inputs to layer 4 via layer 6, in many cortical areas (e.g., Figures 3A and 3D).  Why 
are not these two separate input pathways redundant? Why, in particular, is not the indirect layer 
6-to-4 pathway sufficient to activate layer 4 cells and  to maintain their analog sensitivity using 
its on-center off-surround network? The proposed explanation is that direct inputs to layer 4 are 
needed to supraliminally activate layer 4 cells, since the indirect layer 6-to-4 inputs, being 
subliminal, cannot do so.  
Taken together, these eight cortical design principles lead to the circuit diagram for perceptual 
grouping and attention between LGN, V1, and V2 that is shown in Figure 5.  I propose that the 
same cortical circuits may explain data at multiple levels of cortical organization; for example, 
they are sufficient to explain attentional data collected from macaque cortical areas V2 and V4 
(Motter, 1994a, 1994b; Reynolds et al., 1995), wherein top-down attention once again 
selectively primes features within the attentional focus while suppressing the effects of features 
that are not.  S.  Grossberg            
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Figure 5. A model synthesis of bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal interactions in LGN, V1, 
and V2. Cells and connections in green denote preattentive excitatory mechanisms that are 
involved in perceptual grouping. Red denotes inhibitory mechanisms. Blue denotes top-down 
attentional mechanisms. S.  Grossberg            
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Stable Cortical Development and Adult Learning. With the circuit of Figure 5 in mind, we 
can return to the fundamental question of how the horizontal connections within cortical area V1 
develop through a learning process that is modifiable by visual inputs. How is such development 
stabilized through time? 
A simple and parsimonious answer can now be given, because both preattentive perceptual 
groupings within V1 and attentive feedback from V2 to V1 both generate feedback signals to 
layer 6 of V1. Both types of feedback activate the folded feedback circuit from layer 6-to-4. Top-
down attention uses this circuit to focus attention within V1 by inhibiting layer 4 cells that are 
not supported by excitatory 6-to-4 feedback. Perceptual grouping uses it to inhibit layer 4 cells 
that would otherwise help to form incorrect groupings. In so doing, folded feedback prevents the 
wrong combinations of cells in layers 4 and 2/3 from being active simultaneously, and thereby 
prevents incorrect horizontal connections from being learned between these active cells.  
The folded feedback circuit from layer 6-to-4 gets activated by perceptual grouping signals from 
layer 2/3-to-6 at all  positions of the grouping, even those positions that do not receive bottom-
up inputs. The ART Matching Rule is thus satisfied at all such positions, and the source of the 
“top-down expectation” is the perceptual grouping itself. In summary, the preattentive 
perceptual grouping is its own attentional prime (Figure 6). 
2/3
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4
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Figure 6. The preattentive perceptual grouping is its own attentional prime: An intracortical 
perceptual grouping, such as an illusory contour, uses [Figure caption continued on next page.] 
Figure 6 Continued. the same layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network as does intercortical 
attentional priming. Its off-surround can hereby inhibit incorrect layer 4 cells that could 
otherwise enter into incorrect associations with active layer 2/3 cells. This mechanism works at 
all positions of the grouping, even those that do not receive bottom-up inputs. 
Model simulations of how cortical area V1 develops its horizontal connections in layer 2/3 and 
its interlaminar connections between layers 6 and 4 have demonstrated that stable development 
can be achieved if the on-center off-surround circuits from layer 6-to-4 subliminally activate 
layer 4 cells (Grossberg and Williamson, 1997). When this constraint is not realized, it is much 
harder to stabilize development in the model. By extension, these results suggest how perceptual 
learning in the adult can be stabilized using the same mechanisms. 
Some Predictions. Many predictions are implicit in the cortical design principles that are 
proposed above, since each one predicts a functional role for a known cortical circuit. Some 
particularly worthwhile tests would be: (1) test if top-down V1 to LGN feedback plays a role in 
stabilizing the development of disparity tuning during the visual critical period; (2) test if top-
down feedback from V2 to V1 can supraliminally activate layer 6 cells, but only subliminally 
activate layer 4 cells; (3) test if a long-range horizontal grouping in layer 2/3 of V2 can inhibit 
vertically oriented simple cells at the midpoint of this grouping in layer 4 of V1; (4) test if layer 
4 simple cells cannot be supraliminally activated if only the LGN-to- 6-to-4 input pathway is 
active. Each of these predictions is technically difficult to test, but as increasingly selective 
methods are developed (e.g., Nelson et al., 1994), this will become easier to do. 
Many additional tests of the model can be envisaged. Another test incorporates habituative or 
depressing synapses (Abbott, Varela, Sen, and Nelson, 1997; Grossberg, 1969, 1976b, 1980). 
Several earlier articles have used the hypothesis that habituative synapses may exist in the spatial 
competition stage that occurs prior to bipole grouping, in order to explain psychophysical data 
about visual persistence, perceptual aftereffects, and residual traces (Francis and Grossberg, 
1996a, 1996b; Francis, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1994). In the present laminar model of cortex, 
such synapses may be interpreted to occur in the layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network. If 
this hypothesis is correct, then the following type of experiment, along with variants thereof, 
may be of interest. First, use direct electrical stimulation of area V2 to generate, say, a 
horizontally oriented top-down priming signal to layer 6 of area V1. If such a signal generates 
suprathreshold output signals from layer 6, then they should be able to habituate the synapses in 
the layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network. This habituative effect may then be tested with 
bottom-up horizontal and vertical visual stimuli to the same location. If the top-down habituative 
effect works in the same manner as a prior bottom-up adaptation stimulus (Meyer, Lawson, and 
Cohen, 1975), then persistence of cell responses in layers 2/3 and 4 will be less with a horizontal 
stimulus and greater with a vertical stimulus than it would have been in the absence of the top-
down habituative prime. Such a test would exploit the hypotheses that both the intercortical top-
down priming circuit and the bottom-up activation circuit utilize the same layer 6-to-4 on-center 
off-surround network, and that habituative synapses exist in this network. A related test in area 
V2 would habituate the layer 6-to-4 horizonally oriented synapses in the middle of an illusory 
contour and would then do the same horizontal and vertical persistence test as described above. 
This test would exploit the hypotheses that intracortical feedback signals from layer 2/3 of V2 
and feedforward signals from area V1 to V2 utilize the same layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround S.  Grossberg            
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network, and that habituative synapses exist in this network. Taken together, experiments such as 
these would provide further information about how every preattentive perceptual grouping 
becomes its own attentional prime. 
Learning, Attention, and Grouping in Sensory and Cognitive Neocortex. The present article 
suggests how bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal interactions are organized within visual 
cortical areas V1 and V2. The key impediment to making this synthesis in the past derived from 
an absence of hypotheses about how the cortex uses the folded feedback circuit from layer 6-to-4 
to achieve both top-down attentional priming and analog coherence of preattentive perceptual 
groupings. The hypothesis that this priming circuit obeys the ART Matching Rule enables all 
previous results about how ART interactions stabilize development and learning to be applied to 
the case of cortical development and adult perceptual learning. Many data about preattentive 
grouping of information, attentive priming of information, infant development, and adult 
learning may now be functionally linked to the laminar, columnar, and map organization of the 
visual cortex. This is true, for example, of recent neurophysiological data which have supported 
the key ART predictions that many developmental and learning processes are stabilized 
dynamically using learned top-down expectations, and that adult learning uses the same types of 
mechanisms as the infant developmental processes upon which it builds. These data include: 
shared molecular substrates of neonatal development and adult learning (Bailey et al., 1992; 
Kandel and O’Dell, 1992; Mayford et al., 1992); attentional modulation of cortical development 
(Singer, 1982); plasticity of adult cortical representations after lesions (Merzenich et al., 1988); 
dynamical reorganization of long-range connections in the visual cortex (Gilbert and Wiesel, 
1992; Zohary et al., 1994); fast perceptual learning in the adult (Karni and Sagi, 1991; Poggio, 
Fahle, and Edelman, 1992); and fast cortical synchronization (Eckhorn et al., 1988; Gray and 
Singer, 1989).   
Given the generality of the functional problems that these circuits are proposed to solve, it seems 
plausible that similar circuits may be used throughout the neocortex. Indeed, ART models have 
already been used, albeit without a laminar cortical interpretation, to explain developmental, 
cognitive, and neurobiological data about normal and amnesic recognition learning, 
categorization, working memory, memory search, and hypothesis testing (Grossberg, 1980, 
1982; Grossberg and Stone, 1986; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991, 1993; Grossberg, 1995; 
Grossberg and Merrill, 1996; Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen, 1997). In many of these 
cognitive examples, an orienting system, which has been proposed to be at least partly realized 
in the hippocampal system, interacts with the attentional thalamocortical circuits that do the 
learning. This interaction drives hypothesis testing, or memory search, for new, or more task-
appropriate, recognition categories within the attentional system. Such an orienting system 
enables attention to be allocated in a more flexible way than can be achieved by the attentional 
mechanisms on their own, and permits an enormous expansion in the amount of information that 
can be learned. In this regard, long-range intrinsic connections are also known to occur in many 
areas of neocortex; for example, in the auditory and language areas of the human temporal cortex 
(Schmidt et al., 1997). It remains to be seen whether these model circuits generalize to show 
how other sensory and cognitive regions of the neocortex are functionally organized. 
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